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防衛関係資料 |
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懸賞論文「海上の安全保障」 優秀賞 餅井雅大氏（一橋大大学院） |
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1. Introduction Identifying Japan a “maritime state” becomes a central subject in Japanese policy circle from time to time. In such discourses, it has been often argued that compared to other industrialized maritime states, Japan has been far behind in the institutional mechanism for a single national maritime policy. In his lecture, Kuribayashi Tadao, a professor Emeritus of Keio University and one of the central members in the legislation process, suggested that Japan's lack of a single maritime policy has been a serious concern for policy circles as the other countries has become proactive in setting their maritime policies. From this international trend, it is quite understandable that there has been some urge for the setting of actions for the consolidation of maritime policy in Japan which had been characterized by its fractioned bureaucracy. Putting this cyclical trend for impetus toward maritime policy aside, however, there seems to be scarce attention on strategic implication in the debates in maritime affairs since the World War II. By the enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, is Japan truly becoming a “new maritime state”? If so, what are the possible implications on Japan's security strategy? The purpose of this essay is to conceptualize Japan's maritime strategy from short-term and long-term strategic perspectives based on the changes in policy-process through the enactment the Act. While the Act, made by legislation by House members, stipulates the Basic Plans (Chapter 2) and the Basic Measures (Chapter 3), and the establishment of Headquarters for Ocean Policy (Chapter 4) in its purviews, it is hard to say that the enactment of the Act had occurred with a clear consensus on the national strategy of Japan as a “new maritime state”. This Japan's commitment in becoming “a new maritime state” in the 21 st century seemingly suggests that Alfred Mahan's well-known thesis of “sea power” still sounds true in the today's context. As Mahan suggested, interconnection between wartime strategy and peacetime maritime policies is crucial in maritime affairs. Despite these historical lessons however, there are a number of understatements concerning the “strategic nature” of the motive behind the enactment from the people concerned. Virtually all members in the legislative process explicitly deny that those “strategic” elements were the basic motives for the enacting of the Act. But these attitudes of avoiding “strategic” aspects of maritime policy inside Japanese maritime policy-communities are too cautious one. Current political discourse all over the world somewhat allows the general usage of the term “strategy” over the smart usage of national resources, both civil and military recourses, in their basic documents on national or regional maritime policy. For example, the United Kingdom published document titled as “Safeguarding Our Seas: A Strategy for he Conservation and Sustainable Development of Our Marine Environment” In this sense, the term “strategy”, away from its original meaning derived from Clausewitz's definition of strategy as "the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war" , we can solidify our ideas on what is required for Japan's consolidated maritime policy with longer-term objective in our minds. 2. Recommendations for MOD and JSDFs in Domestic Policy-making process: --Forming the Constellation Optimal for Strategic Maritime Policy-- 2.1 Proactive Contribution to the Domestic Policy Process by Supplying Expertise As is often case with the Japanese policy-making process, establishing “Headquarters” or any interagency policy-coordination would not automatically lead to a single consolidated policy based on strategic thinking. To make such inter-agency nature of the “Headquarters” more strategically effective, MOD and JSDFs should actively send their human recourses with strategic insight for the long term objective of forming the organizational culture of the secretariats in “Headquarters”. Currently, the post of the Minister of Maritime Affairs is concurrently held by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. If the aim of the Act for independent and consolidated maritime policy-making process is to be realized, the stand of the Minister has to be the one of equidistance from other ministers. As for senior officials as well as officials in pettier ranks in their secretariats too, it is clear that the expertise required for the policy-making in maritime affairs involves the defense expertise. Taking this backdrop, the role of Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces, especially maritime one, in supplying the required personnel is crucial. It should be noted, however, that this role should be fulfilled on the basis of broader national interest achieved through having integrated civil maritime policy. By no means, this should be used as a pretext for the enhancement of emphasis of the importance of maritime defense capability compared with other JSDFs. The required expertise for the personnel in the “Headquarters” should not be limited to marine related ones. MOD and JSDFs should take broader insights that can be injected by expertise specific to MOD and JSDFs officers. 2.2 Effective Policy Forming through “Space and Maritime Policy Chamber” In line with their proactive contributions in the personnel of secretariats in the “Headquarters”, MOD and JSDFs as a whole should pursue their roles in setting strategy by making full use of “Space and Maritime Policy Chamber” expected to be in action inside the MOD. In selecting personnel in the Chamber, the supreme objective should be the one that maximizes effective and strategic policy-making with regard to Japan's urgent needs for responding threats arising from neighboring countries especially China in Space and Marine. If the establishment of division degenerates into the silly fight over the authority inside bureaucracy, it would make things worse by sending wrong message about its preparedness on Space and Maritime Strategy without any solid foundation underneath it. To avoid such worst case scenario, both MOD and JSDFs as a whole should seek the national interest, not the interests of their own, so as to make the message with confidence and effectiveness in forming strategically formulated policies. For the assurance of the pursuing of “maximization of national interest” instead of “maximization of each”, careful observation by experts from outside government, including academics and business communities, should be invited. 3. Recommendations for MOD and JSDFs in International Policy Making Process --Pursuing a Proactive Role in the Rule Making in International Maritime Regimes in the 21 st century-- 3.1 Proactive Role in the Rule-Making: Japan's International Maritime Policy It has been often argued that Japan has lacked initiative in creating the international environment that according to her vision. In his paper on the effect of maritime policies of each state on the international maritime control regime, Terashima expects Japanese leadership in international arena as an essential policy agenda in Japanese foreign policy. This argument is highly convincing given the history of the making of rules and the formation of order in international maritime regime. Historically, prominent maritime states, like Dutch Republic and the United Kingdom, had actively engaged in the formation of the maritime regime according to their own specific needs. Compared to those historical maritime states, Japan's role in formation of international maritime regime has been somewhat minor one. Instead of actively pursuing the formation of international rules according to her own vision, Japan has been a passive rule-taker that has just responded the already-made rules by other states. Many commentators subscribe this passivity in Japan's international stand to Japan's cultural tendency . If this line of argument is correct, Japan's insular culture leads to Japan's identity as a passive insular state. However, insularity is not the thing required for the establishment of Japan's international stand as a “new maritime state”. Instead of a rule-taker that has been already set, Japan can take a role in rule making in international ocean regime. Taking proactive roles in international arena requires a solid strategic insight. Instead of taking broader national interest into policy consideration, Japan's maritime policy has been focused too narrowly on the benefits on its fishery policy. Although there is no doubt that fishery is one of the crucial areas in which Japan's survival as a state at stake, international maritime regime consists of far broader policy areas in which dire national interests is involving. As Terashima suggests, Japan often neglects the importance of international policy-making process especially with regard to Action Plans adopted in various international meetings . In such meetings, broader range of participants, including experts from various fields and non-governmental organizations, contributes constructive inputs for the formation of international maritime regime. In such processes, expertise obtained only through the MOD and JSDFs as a whole is essential for Japan's strategic participation in these rule-making meeting. Especially, ex-JSDFs officers can contribute their expertise in the Japanese policy based on national interest in multilateral meeting on the international maritime rule-making. Instead of giving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs monopoly over multilateral meetings, engaging in the rule-making with appropriate expertise is necessary especially in international maritime regime which requires high level of expertise. 3.2 A “New Maritime State” over Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum Following the above prescription over roles to be taken by MOD and JSDFs as a whole, we need to Japan's new international stand as a “new maritime state” into historical context. From international perspective, the purpose of the Act stipulated in the preamble clause is not clear enough to make Japan's international stand as a “new maritime state” in today's world. For example, there is not clear statement as for waters in which Japan commits herself as a “maritime state”. Considering the current regime of international maritime control, in addition to declare her commitments in regimes concerning the mare liberum , Japan needs to explicitly set the specific waters and range of activities she is willing to pursue. In comprehensive coverage of treaties, legal instruments and sets of intuitions constituting international trade regime in present day, among other things, historical development of treaty-based regime systems in admiralty and maritime law should not be neglected. The history of evolution of international maritime law certainly clarifies the development of international law throughout history. The first attempt (allegedly by Western intellectuals) for legal frameworks in the field of maritime issue was made by Hugo Grotius, often dabbed as the “father of international law” in conventional textbook accounts. In his Mare Liberum, Grotius came up with the new principle that the sea was international territory and all nations were free to use it for seafaring trade . Such was his conception of the notion of “free sea” that enabled the Dutch Republic to enjoy maritime supremacy based on her advanced admiralty and technologies . This historical lesson provides us with the important principle in becoming a “new maritime state” in the 21 st century. Historically, no state expands its international stand without proactive participation in rule-making and institutional building of the age. For a “new maritime state” to be an internationally distinguished state, we need to have strategy over the present system of maritime governance. As Akiyama suggests, today's international maritime regime is characterized by the term “maritime governance” in line with the general theme of “Global Governance”. In this world, being a “new maritime state” implies being a state that has a clear stake in the maritime governance in the 21 st century. Efforts to be taken to fulfill Japan's stake in international maritime governance involves mainly two aspects: namely the international legal structure and institutional/organizational structure. For Japan's proactive engagements in norm-setting phase in international maritime governance, Japan must have consolidated domestic policy-making process in maritime policy. In this phase, MOD and JSDFs as a whole must actively seek necessary stake inside Japanese policy-making so as to the outcome of policy toward international rule making be in line with Japan's crucial national interest. In the second phase, Japan must actively pursue sending human resource with appropriate expertise and roles to be fulfilled. 4. Conclusion: Setting Clear Objectives Achieved by Being “a New Maritime State” This essay showed the incoming Japanese maritime policy based on the enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy needs to be followed by a single consolidated maritime strategy that guarantee the effectiveness of specific policy areas covered by the Act. With this prospect in mind, the first thing to be done in setting a maritime strategy is to set out the aim. This essay prescribed two recommendations for MOD and JSDF as a whole, one for domestic policy-making, and the other is for international policy-making. These two recommendations reflect the general weakness in Japanese policy-making process; namely the lack of a single consolidated top-down policy mechanism based on national strategy. This lack of national strategy is not new to post-war Japanese policy-making process. On his famous essay entitled “a vision for Japan as a maritime state”, Kosaka follows somewhat hackneyed comparison with the United Kingdom in the 18 th century as a great maritime state while characterizing Japan in those years as insular state. While such anecdotic way of defining what it is to be a maritime state contributes to raise awareness of general publics, we need further specification on the concept of “a maritime state”, with both pros and cons from especially strategic perspective. It is far from correct to state that the geographical fact about Japan automatically leads to the Japan's characteristic as a maritime state. Rather, being a maritime state is a matter of choice: we become a maritime state by recognizing advantages and disadvantage of being a maritime state, instead of being a cyber state for example, and setting clear objectives attained by projecting Japan as a maritime state. This task should be achieved through the circle of policy-makers as well as academic communities.
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